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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs.

Civil No. 15694

UTAH TURKEY GROWERS, INC. , a
Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

:9

:6

'6

12

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action the plaintiff-appellant seeks a money
judgment against the defendant-respondent.

Respondent sold turkeys

and retained the proceeds from the sale of those birds without
12

delivering to plaintiff the amount plaintiff claims was due it.
i2

Plaintiff claims at all times it had a security interest in the
turkeys and in the proceeds from their sale.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial judge, The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, district
Judge in the Sixth Judicial District, sitting without a jury,
dismissed plaintiff's complaint against the defendant.

He also

dismissed defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
i

Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse that portion

o'l

the lower court judgment which dismissed plaintiff-appellant's
complaint.

It seeks to have this Court direct the lower

enter judgment in favor or the plaintiff.

court~

Plaintiff-appellant does

not seek reversal of that portion of the trial court judgment whic!.
dismissed the defendant-respondent's counterclaim.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-respondent (hereafter UTG)

is, and at least,

since 1973, has been an agricultural marketing cooperative which
Duri~

processes and sells turkeys raised by its member growers.

the period 1973 through 1976, its largest single member grower we
partnership comprised of Ivan E. Carlson, Clair R. Carlson and
Vernon J. Carlson, and generally known as Carlson Brothers.
Plaintiff-appellant (hereafter Bank) had financed the
turkey growing operations of Carlson Brothers for some time,

a~,

specifically provided financing for Carlson Brothers' operations
during the years 1973 through 1976 (Tr. 32-33, 257).

The partner·

ship members of Carlson Brothers signed security agreements in h0
of the Bank for the years 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 (Exhibit P-4,'
Tr. 32, 257-259).

The Bank filed financing statements on those

security agreements with the Secretary of State's office (Exhibit
P-6, Tr. 33).

Certified copies of the financing

received as evidence at trial

(Exhibit P-8, Tr.

~tatements

34-35).

The
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security agreements signed by Carlson Brothers in favor of the

«1

plaintiff-appellant specifically gave the Bank a security interest

I in Carlson Brothers turkeys and in the proceeds from the sale
thereof (Exhibit P-4).

o

The Warranty and Covenants paragraph of the

security agreements stated that:
Debtor [Carlson Brothers] will not sell or
dispose of any of the collateral covered
hereby, nor part with possession of any of
the same or proceeds thereof except to Bank
or with consent of Bank nor remove or permit
it to be removed from the county where now
situate without the prior written consent of
Bank, except as necessary to feed or otherwise care for the collateral.
(emphasis
added).

ast

The security agreements and financing statements were given

ng

to secure various promissory notes and extensions of notes which
was

Carlson Brothers owed the Bank

(Exhibit P-1, Tr. 32-33).

Business

records of the Bank reflect that Carlson Brothers outstanding unpaid
obligation to the plaintiff-appellant Bank is at least $556,342.46
(Exhibit P-2, Tr. 31-32), which sum the Bank has been unable to
,d,

collect.
iS

Throughout the 1973 through 1976 period in question, the
defendant UTG processed and sold the turkeys of its member growers
far!

to Norbest, Inc.

Prior to the 1976 growing year all of UTG's member

growers, including Carlson Brothers, were under a common pool
arrangement with the defendant (Tr. 179-180).

In this arrangement

all birds of the member growers were commingled and merged into a

re
oornmon flock.

After the birds were processed and sold, the
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defendant would settle with each grower individually.

Each

grower's settlement distribution was based on that grower's
percentage of total poundage of the common flock.

(Tr. 179).

defendant would sell the entire flock to Norbest, Inc.

Norbest

would pay defendant for the birds, and defendant, after subtractir::l
processing costs on a per pound percentage basis (Tr. 176-175),
would make distributions to its various member growers.
Although the periodic advancements made by UTG to its
growers did not necessarily constitute the exact sum the

I

gro~r~

eventually to receive, a yearly final settlement statement and a

I

final settlement check (usually prepared into the next growing

year) were to reconcile all advances and charges to the grower fori
the year.

Evidence introduced at trial clearly revealed the

understanding of both U'fG's management, and the individual growerol
!
that a final settlement was to conclude and reconcile finally all,
advances made and charges assessed against the grower for the
in question.

(Tr. 178, 261, 190-291, 301-302, 311).

~~

When the
I

final settlement check was issued, it was assumed that all charge;!
for that growing year had been subtracted.

The net amount of tha:

check was the final reconciliation between the grower and the
processor

(Tr. 178, 261, 301-302, 311).
Insofar as its present President could recall, the defer:.

ant, prior to 1976, had never assessed an offset against its
growers after a final s•. 1.tlement for the prior grm,•ing yevr had
been finalized.

(Tr. 322)

(See also Tr. 308).
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During the period relevant to the lawsuit the Bank was,
of course, aware that the UTG was processing Carlson Brothers'
turkeys.

It was generally aware that the defendant was selling

the turkeys of its member growers to Norbest.

But the Bank also

had expected to be paid and, in the usual course of its business,
was generally paid the net proceeds the defendant received from
the sale of Carlson Brothers' turkeys.

The Bank had financed

operations of Carlson Brothers for several years, and had never
been aware that Utah Turkey Growers might attempt to exercise a
retroactive setoff after it had finally settled with Carlson
Brothers for any growing year.

There was no history of dealings

by which the Bank was put on notice that UTG might pierce its own

final settlement and retroactively claim from its growers purported overadvances for years earlier than the final settlement.
Although unaware of any overadvances made to Carlson

ear

Brothers by UTG, the Bank, in 1976, was concerned about Carlson
Brothers' ability to pay off its existing loans with the Bank.

gesl

Accordingly, for the 1976 growing year, the Bank urged Carlson

ha:

Brothers to alter in some material respects its arrangement with
the defendant.

Consequently, for the 1976 growing year, Carlson

Brothers' turkeys
er

(all of which were secured collateral of the

Bank) were not placed in the usual common flock with birds of the
other birds owned by the various member growers of UTG.

Rather,

for 1976, Carlson Brothers' turkey crop was the subject of "live
flock" or "direct marketing" agreement.
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Under the direct marketing arrangement Carlson Brothers'
1976 turkeys were not commingled with the birds of defendant's ot

growers

(Tr. 181), but were sold in identifiable lots to the

defendant.

The defendant then sold those birds, again in a separc''

lot or lots, to Norbest.

The turkeys of Carlson Brothers were
1

weighed live and paid for on a live basis (Tr. 180).

Both UTG anc I
I

Norbest treated the birds on a different basis than they did birds
which were part of the general common pool of the defendant's
remaining turkey growers (Tr. 182, 184-185).
Under the live flock contracts betv1een Carlson Brothers :·1
UTG and Norbest

(Exhibit P-12), there was not only a different

marketing arrangement than had been the case under the common

1

I

poc~,l

but also, and more importantly, a substantially altered position

c'(
I

Carlson Brothers vis-a-vis Utah Turkey Growers (Tr. 186-190). Th'

I

I

turkeys Carlson Brothers sold UTG in 1976 were on a non-member bas:l
quite different from the traditional common pool (Tr. 186).

Carlsol

Brothers waived patronage equities under the new arrangement t~t

1

I

would not have been waived under the old (Tr. 187).

Margins whic''

otherwise would have belonged to Carlson Brothers became margins
belonging to the defendant (Tr. 189-190).

The birds sold by Car;;::

Brothers to UTG in 1976 were no longer considered membership ton·•:!
(Tr. 190).

In short, the birds sold by Carlson to the ilefenc1ant

1976 were sold under a materially different arrangement than

1
'

01

existed earlier, and Carlson Brothers found itself in a suhsL':
ally different economic relationship with UTG.
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It is noteworthy that at the time the 1976 direct marketing
agreement between Carlson Brothers and UTG was signed, and the
altered relationship between those parties was thus created, no
indication was given by UTG to Carlson Brothers that the defendant
intended to setoff alleged overadvances on pre-1976 turkeys against

)

the new and different 1976 live flock or direct marketing agreement

I

(Tr. 262-263).
Prior to August 1, 1976, the Bank was not aware of any
overadvancement in favor of or offset to be claimed against Carlson
Brothers (Tr. 66).

:·1

However, during the year 1974, it was apparent

to Kendrick Harward, UTG's then manager, that defendant's payments
received for 1974 birds were being used to pay for the 1973 final
settlement.

And in 1975 he felt that monies received for 1975 birds

hE:
1

were being used to pay the 1974 final settlements (Tr. 337-338).

~j

Yet, although Mr. Harward was aware that the Bank was financing

lESI

Carlson Brothers' operations (Tr. 333), he didn't inform the Bank of

t

his concerns that money for current year birds was being used to pay

I

I

c'!

on prior year's settlements (Tr. 338) .
An important fact in this case is a January, 1976, letter

1''

sent by UTG to the Bank (Exhibit P-9).

r~:l

Byron Cheever, Manager of the Spanish Fork branch of the Bank,

In late 1975 or early 1976

requested that Gaylord Harward, Manager of the defendant, supply the
I I

Bank with a letter regarding the status of Carlson Brothers turkeys
held by UTG.

The Bank requested this information so that the Bank

might know what monies it could expect to receive to reduce the 1975
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year Carlson Brothers' loans.

The Bank also wanted that informatiq

to determine whether it would finance the 1976 turkey operations
Carlson Brothers (Tr. 50).

o'l

i

When the request for information was

received by Mr. Gaylord Harward he assumed the Bank wanted the
information because it was interested in the amount Carlson Broth~:~
would receive from the 1975 birds (Tr. 154).

He knew the plaintifl

looked to the defendant and to him, as manager, to furnish the Ba~·i
accurate information as to the status of the Carlson Brothers'
account

(Tr. 154).

And, finally, he assumed the Bank wanted the

requested information because Carlson Brothers had outstanding
obligations it owed to the Bank (Tr. 155).
The January 7, 1976, letter was written to the Bank undc
UTG's letterhead

(Exhibit P-9).

It was signed by its manager inU

official capacity as manager of the defendant-respondent (Tr. 150: ·

I

The information gave Carlson Brothers' total tonnage for the 197!
year

(Tr. 155).

It referred to advances to date made by UTG in

favor of Carlson Brothers (Tr. 156).

And also mentioned anticipa'l

future sums hoped to be realized if market conditions held
(Tr. 156-157).

Mr. Hanvard knew that by giving the Bank all oft·:
.,I

information, he had given the Bank a basis by which it could mu;.·,

I

ply tonnage by price to be realized, and, thus an anticipated
settlement figun'

(Tr. 157).

InC!eed, Mr. Hanvard anticipated t''1

Bank would make such multiplications when he provi.deci it with ti.,
information (Tr. 158).
price,

By multiplying the tonnage by anticipoi'

the Bank determined that Carlson Brothers wouln receive

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The letter made no references to any UTG concerns about
overadvancement made by the defendant in favor of Carlson Brothers.
The Bank was given no any indication that UTG intended to exercise
any setoff against any such overadvances (Tr. 158).

Mr. Harward

admitted that during the period between September, 1974, and

.

'\

September, 1975, he discussed with his father and predecessor

f(

manager of defendant, possible shortages which had arisen because
the defendant was paying for prior years' birds with current year's
money (Tr. 160).

After the settlement of the 1974 year it was

evident that shortages were present (Tr. 161, 337).
Absent knowledge or information that sums had been overadvanced to Carlson Brothers by the defendant, the plaintiff
advanced Carlson Brothers about $593,000 in 1976 (Tr. 65).

The

·:~
1

information contained in the January, 1976, letter (Exhibit P-9) was

1'1,

~I

part of the information the Bank used in determining whether to
finance Carlson Brothers 1976 credit line (Tr. 52).

Mr. Roy W.

Hanson, a senior Vice President of the Southern Division of plaintiff, and one of the representatives of plaintiffs who participated
in its decision to advance 1976 monies to Carlson Brothers,
~ ; ,I

"I
I

testified that the January, 1976, letter "was a very basic factor"
in the decision to extend credit to Carlsons for its 1976 operations
(Tr. 101).
As late as August 21, 1976, the Bank still believed it
~ould

receive from UTG a sum of about $400,000 for the final settle-

ment of Carlson Brothers 1975 turkey crop (Tr. 55).

A Bank document
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(Exhibit P-5) dated in early August, 1976, refers to a telephone

I

call made by the Bank to the defendant-respondent, and in which t~\

I

defendant indicated it had mailed a $55,000 check to the Bank on
Carlson Brothers' behalf, and that
• the settlement for the 1975 turkeys in
the approximate amount of $415,000.00 will
ber mailed before the end of this week.
(Exhibit P-5).

The Bank never received that dollar amount or any part of I
that amount from Utah Turkey Growers from the 1975 final settlement for Carlson Brothers (Tr. 58).

By August, 1976, the defend-

ant either had setoff or knew it would setoff against its growers'
1975 settlement to correct the alleged overadvancements made in
prior years

I
,1

I
[

(Tr. 202).

UTG' s concern about the possible over advancements led it
to request its accountant, DeLance W. Squires to conduct an
sive examination of its books in May or June of 1976

inten-~

(Tr. 120).

Although Mr. Squires had audited the operating portion of the
defendant in prior years, he had not, prior to 1976, been asked tel
review the grower settlement accounts on turkey sales (Tr. 137) ·
As a result of his investigations, Mr. Squires determinec
that for the years 1973 and 1974 the defendant-respondent had
overadvanced approximately $750,000.00!

(Exhibit P-16).

Of thi:

nearly three-quarters of a million dollars, Mr. Squires conclude:
that about $456,000 had been overadvanced to Carlson !Jro'hers
(Exhibits P-15, P-16 Tr. 127-128).

Based upon these computiltio•::
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the defendant-respondent setoff the full amount of what would have
been the 1975 settlement sum due Carlson Brothers, namely about
$343,000

(Tr. 204).

Although the defendant felt Carlson Brothers

still had been overadvanced a net sum of $113,000 after the setoff
from what would have been the 1975 final settlement (Tr. 204), it
made no attempt to exercise any further setoff until after Carlson
Brothers 1976 growing year was completed (Tr. 205, 209-210).
The audit by Squires disclosed two major sources of the
claimed overadvancements in favor of Carlson Brothers.
I

I

First, Mr.

Squires believed that when the defendant-respondent computed the
1974 final settlement it overlooked a $262,000 check payable to
Carlson Brothers as an advance (Tr. 142).

Although UTG's own

records clearly reflected the existence of this payment
-1

I

(Tr. 144-145, 210-212, 288), the payment was simply overlooked by
both Gaylord Harward (Tr.
Mickelsen (Tr. 288).

0'

I

210-211) and the bookkeeper, Della

The following colloquy occurred at trial:

Question: Do you have any idea at all as to
why this particular check didn't show up on
the 1974 final settlement?
Answer [Mr. Harward):
sight (Tr. 211).

It was just an over-

The net effect of all of this was that the defendantrespondent made a duplicate credit to Carlson Brothers in 1974-1975
in the sum of $262,000.

First, a normal advance was made to

Carlson Brothers, and then, at the time of settlement, that payment
\vas overlooked

(Tr. 142).

The Bank, however, was not aware of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

overpayment (nor was Carlson Brothers).

The information which

disclosed the claimed overpayment was within, and apparently o~y
within, the custody and control of the defendant-respondent.
Another main source of overadvancements was caused by
UTG's reliance on a single kind of document supplied it by
Norbest.

In making its advancements to its growers, UTG relied on

the Nor best Settlement Summary (Tr. 355-356, 358).

This document

was a computer printout sheet which the defendant received weekly
from Norbest.

It purported to summarize sales, poundage and prices

on a year to date basis (Tr. 354, 357).

However, the

defendan~

respondent also received weekly a product settlement summary and a
sales remittance report ('Cr. 354).

The sales remittance report

reflected charges for the week -- the product settlement summary
reflected weekly sales.

(Id.)

The major difference between the

product settlement summary and the Norbest settlement summary was
that the product settlement summary only purported to reflect
actions taken weekly whereas the Norbest settlement summary, on its:
face, purported to reflect transactions on a year to date basis
(Tr. 357).
UTG relied on the Norbest summary in making advancements
to its growers

(Tr. 358).

It diO not use the sales remittance

report or the product sales surrw.ary.

The defel"·.~

.1

1t believed that

all charges reflected in the sales remittance report had been
included in the year to date figures

(Tr. 358).

In point of face,

the
Norbest
settlement
summary
did
not
all
the Services
reversP
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settlements and chargebacks that had been assessed against the 1973
and 1974 turkeys

(Tr. 390).

As a result the auditor concluded

substantial overadvancements had thus been made.
Although its management was concerned in 1974 and 1975
that overadvancements had been made, UTG never totaled the product
settlement summaries and the sales remittance reports for any given
period and compared that total with the total figures reflected on
the Norbest settlement summaries for the same period (Tr. 359).

It

waited until 1976 to have its accountant review the grower settlement accounts (Tr. 137).

A comparison of the weekly totaled

reports and the year to date reports would have reflected the
discrepancy between them (Tr. 360).
Although it setoff nearly $345,000 from Carlson Brothers
sometime during the summer of 1976, prior to late November of that
year UTG never put plaintiff on notice that it intended to exercise
any setoff against Carlson's 1976 crop which was covered by the new
live flock arrangement (Tr. 76, 202-203).

From July until November

1976 the defendant paid the Bank directly for Carlson Brothers'
turkeys it sold Norbest (Exhibit P-11, Tr. 68).

In advancing

nearly $600,000 to Carlson Brothers for its 1976 birds, the Bank
had no knowledge that the defendant intended to exercise the setoff
against 1976 year birds (Tr. 75).

It was only in late November,

after the Bank had advanced more than a half million dollars during
1976, after Carlson's 1976 season was over, and only on the last
two checks the defendant received from Norbest for Carlson Brothers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1976 turkeys, that defendant setoff not only the $113,000 it
claimed was due for overadvancements to Carlsons, but also, an
additional $28,000 for accounts receivable (insurance policy
premiums paid) of long standing which it claimed Carlson Brothers
owed it (Tr 207).
overadvanced;

This was admittedly not a sum which had been

neither was it any obligation plaintiff owed

defendant (Id.).

ARGUMENT
I.
THE BANK DID NOT WAIVE ITS SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE
19 7 3 THROUGH 19 7 6 CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS AND/OR IN THE
PROCEEDS THEREOF. THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT
THERE HAD BEEN A WAIVER.
Sectio:-J. 70A-9-306 (2) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
as it was in effect prior to 1977, provided:
Except where this chapter otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof by the debtor
unless his action was authorized by the
secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collection received
by the debtor.
(emphasis added)
Section 71A-9-307(l) states:
A buyer in the ordinary course of
business • . . other than a person buving
farm products fro~ a person engaged in
~rming operatiO.!:J_§_ takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though
the security interest is perfected and even
though the buyer knows of its existence.
(emphasis added)
Section 70A-9-l09(3) reads:
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(3)
Goods are "farm products" if they are
crops or livestock or supplies used or
produced in farming operations or if they are
products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured states . . . and if they are
in the possession of a debtor engaged in
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming
operations.
If goods are farm products thev
are neither equipment nor inventory.
~
(emphasis added)l
Based upon the foregoing provisions of the Utah Code, and
based upon the uncontroverted evidence at trial, the Bank believes
it had an attached and perfected security interest in the 1973
through 1976 Carlson Brothers'

turkeys and their proceeds.

In

paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law the
trial court found that the Bank did properly obtain and perfect
security interests in Carlson Brothers' turkeys and their
proceeds.

(R 261-262).

Since the turkeys were "farm products" as

defined by 70A-9-109(3) of the Code, UTG did not receive those
turkeys free of the Bank's security interests.

And unless the

Bank authorized the disposition of the turkeys by UTG and the
exercise of its claimed right of setoff against Carlson Brothers,
the Bank retained its security interest in those birds and in the
proceeds from their sale.

The Bank disagrees with the court's

1 In 1977 the statute was amended to provide:
Except where this statute otherwise provides, a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
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finding that it waived its security interest in the proceeds as
against UTG, and suggests to this court that the lower court
ruling on the waiver issue was contrary to law and to the clear
weight of the evidence at trial.
Although the case did not deal with a continuing

securi~

interest in farm products, in a case involving other secured
collateral, this Court has held that a secured party's security
interest was not extinguished when the collateral was transferred.

In First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Zions First National

Bank, N.A., 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975), an action to determine the
priority of security interests in various types of non-farm
collateral, the court held in part:
. The security interest of plaintiff in
the transferred assets was not extinguished
by the plaintiff taking a new promissory note
procured by the security agreements entered
on February 12, 1974. The transferred assets
not being subject to the defendant's security
interest, the new security agreement entered
into on February 12, 1974, does not have the
effect of subordinating the plaintiff's
interest in the transferred assets.
Id. at
1026-1027.
An Oregon case involved fact situations in many ways
analagous to those involved in this case.

And in the decision

Baker Production CreLt Association v. Long Creek Meat Co., Inc.,
513 P.2d 1129 (Ore. JJ73), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a
secured party's claim for proceeds · Jainst a contention that the
secured party had acquiesced in the sale of the collatera1.

Ir

that case, the plaintiff lender financed the operation of a cilt'
The
grower
security
favor
of the
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lender, which agreements provided that the collateral would not be
sold without the secured party's consent.
secured cattle to a processor.

The grower sold the

The processor was financed by a

Bank which would pay the grower for cattle sold by the processor.
The draft in favor of the grower was issued to the grower's
lender, the secured party.
In Baker the Bank for the processor and the eventual
purchaser felt that the processor's line of credit had been used
up.

It then dishonored drafts in the sum of $88,000 payable to

the secured party for the processor's purchase of the grower's
cattle.

Thereafter, the Bank for the eventual purchaser and the

processor received checks from the processor for the purchase of
cattle purchased by the processor from the grower.

The Bank

applied these checks to reduce the processors' obligation to it,
but did not honor the drafts to the secured party.

The issue was

whether the Bank for the processor and eventual seller converted
the collateral or proceeds of the secured party.
The trial court held that it had so converted and the
Supreme Court of Oregon agreed.

The appellate court specifically

held that the cattle were "farm products" within the meaning of
the Uniform Commercial Code and that the secured creditors
security interest continued to cover the cattle carcasses even
though they had been sold to the processor and again to the
eventual seller.

Id. at 1132.

It held the secured party's secur-

ity interest also covered the "proceeds" of those carcasses.

Id.
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A major issue on appeal was 1o1hether the secured party's
security interest was waived because it had con sen ted to the sale
of the cattle.

The agreement between the secured party and the

grower provided the cattle would not be sold without the
party's consent.

secur~

The appellate court agreed with the lower court

finding that the secured party had consented on condition that
payment was received by it when the cattle were sold to the
eventual purchaser.

Until the Bank for the processor and eventual

purchaser refused to honor its drafts, the drafts had always

bee~

honored and there was no reason for the secured party to object.
Id. at 1133.

When the Bank failed to pay the drafts the condi-

tions of the secured party's consent were not met.
security interest was not lost.

Therefore its

Id. at 1134.

In the course of the opinion the court wrote:
The Code's provisions on Security interests
in farm products prefer the secured party
over the buyer in the ordinary course of
business except where the secured party
waives his interest by authorizing actions
by the debtor which are inconsistent with
the existence of that interest. Where, as
here, the secured party has every reason to
believe that its security interest will be
recognized and protected by both its debtor
and the purchaser from the debtor, there is
no reason to hold that the security interest
has been extinguish _·n.
I<'l. at 1135.
See
also \'iabasso State h,mk -;:;-: Calcl·,;ell Packing
Co., 251 N.W.2d 321 --(Minn. 321); and see
COlorado Bank and Trust Co. v. \•)estern Slope
Investments, Inc., 539 P.2d 501 (Colo. App.
1975).
First Security Bank urges that the reasoning in the
Oregon case should apply to the case now before this Court.
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consent given by First Security to UTG's sale of Carlson Brothers'
turkeys

(in which the Bank had a security interest) was subject to

the condition that the Bank be paid the proceeds of any such sale
(Tr. 77-78).

The prior course of dealings between the parties had

generally been that the Bank was so paid.

Prior to mid-1976 UTG

had never tried to setoff from the Bank sum representing alleged
overadvancements to its growers (Tr. 78).

The Bank had no prior

knowledge that the setoffs would be made (Tr. 66, 75).
consent to such setoffs.

It did not

UTG took the turkeys and proceeds

subject to the Banks's prior perfected security interest and could
not legitimately dispose of the birds or proceeds to the detriment
of the Bank.

The Bank did not waive its security interest in

favor of UTG (Tr. 77).
Plaintiff recognizes decisions in some other jurisdictions have not followed the Baker P.C.A. case, supra (i.e. Clovis
National Bank v. Thomas, 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967).

But it urges

that because of the factual similarity between the facts in Baker
and the facts in this case, and because of the clarity of its
Baker decision in announcing a policy favoring a continuity of
security interests which appears to follow this Court's decision
in the Zions Bank case, supra, earlier cited, this Court should
follow the Baker decision here.

be reversed.

The trial court decision should

There simply was no waiver of its security interest

by the Bank.
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II. UNDER PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION THE DEFENDANT
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO RETURN THE PROCEEDS IT WITHHELD
FROM PLAINTIFF BY REASON OF ITS SETOFFS.
A.
HAVING NEGLIGENTLY GIVEN PLAINTIFF INFOru1ATION
WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO CHANGE ITS POSITION,
DEFENDANT SHOULD RESTORE TO PLAINTIFF THE ~lONIES IT
WITHHELD FRDr-1 PLAINTIFF.
The case now before this court is not without its complexity.

Essentially however, the Bank believes the matter

reduced to two fairly simple propositions.

can~

The bank has (or had)

perfected scecurity interests in the Carlson Brothers' turkeys
their proceeds.

a~

If it did not waive those security interests, it

had a superior interest to any claimed by UTG.

But if, arguendo,

there were a waiver of the Bank's security interest in favor of
UTG, then that waiver

(if it existed) would have occurred

the Bank changed its position in reliance:

beca~e

l) on the January 7, I

1976 letter; and 2) on a course of business dealings involving the~
Bank and UTG which involved payments made to the Bank by UTG on
behalf of Carlson Brothers (Exhibit P-11, Tr. 152) which payments
were made over the years without any purported retroactive

setoff~

having been claimed.
As has been stated earlier, the Bank received indicatioo•
from UTG personnel that the Bank would have as security for its
loans to Carlson Brothers an appro~imate $400,000 sum from the
final settlement of the 1964 year crop (Exhibit P-5, Tr. 55-551 ·
The Bank would have attempted to have diverted the 1976 turkeysc
Carlson Brothers to another source it had been aware that UTG
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intended to claim the offsets against Carlson Brothers (Tr. 25).
Even if the Bank did benefit from overpayments UTG made to Carlson
Brothers it changed its position in reliance on the accuracy of
statements or failures to disclose by UTG.
A leading writer in the field of restitution writes:
A good faith recipient of a benefit can
be excused from restitution if he has, albeit
only partially, changed his position in such
a way as to make it inequitable that he
should restore it.
Though most frequently
arising where restitution is sought of
benefits conferred by mistake, this defense
pervades the entire field.
It often overlaps
with the defense of laches, and is analogous
to estoppel, but a change of position is not
ncessarily bound up with any unreasonable
delay on the part of the claimant nor with
any detrimental reliance on another's representations.
Of basic importance is that the
recipient must not have been tortious in his
orignial acquisition of the benefit, and that
the change of circumstances must have taken
place before he became aware of any duty to
make restitution
" Douthwaite,
Attorneys Guide to Restitution § 9.2
pp. 369-370.
The same author continues:
Frequent examples of the defense of
change of position are presented where the
mistake has resulted in the recipient's loss
of some security right he would otherwise
have had against a debtor, or in his having
allowed his claim to become unenforceable by
lapse of time.
If the change of position
consists of the fact the benefit has been
lost, stolen, or even given away, assuming
his complete ignorance of any possibility of
a liability to make restitution, it would
seem sound to let the loss be where it fell;
by hypothesis, the recipient had no duty to
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conserve it for the claimant.
Id. at 371-372
(emphasis added) .
See also Restatement of
Restitution § 69 (1) pp. 284 285 (1937):
(1)
The right of a person to restitution from another because of a benefit
received because of mistake is terminated or
diminished if, after the receipt of the
benefit, circumstances have so changed that
it would be unequitable to require the other
to make full restitution.
In Allcity Insurance Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. of Albany,
80 Misc. 2d 899, 364 NYS./2d 791 (1975), an insurer mistakenly
paid a bank certain monies.

As a result, the bank released its

security interest in an allegedly insured car.

The insurer

recovered from the insured but was barred from recovery against
the bank because the bank had changed its position.

The bank

h~

lost a security interest it otherwise would have had against the
insured, and had changed its position.
In the case before this court the Bank changed its
position by deciding to continue to finance the 1976 operationsclr
Carlson Brothers because it assumed it was adequately secured.

Iii

forebore on the right it had to preclude Carlson Brothers from

I

selling its 1976 turkeys to U'l'G.

It refrained from conducting it'!

own sale, under the terms of which UTG would have been precluded I
from diminishing the proceeds by setoff.

If the Court believes

that the Bank did ac,uiesce in the sales by UTG to Norbest in su:
a manner as to deprive the Bank of its security interest, th2n,
such event, the Bank would have lost a security interest in
reliance on a course of dealings which gave no suggest ion as tc
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the offset against the Carlson Brothers 1975 and 1976 turkey
crop.

Any one of these would have constituted a change of posi-

tion by the Bank which precluded any offset by the defendant UTG.

B.
HAVING MADE A WHOLE SERIES OF PAYNENTS DIRECTLY TO THE
BANK UNDER THE 1976 LIVE FLOCK MARKETING ARRANGEMENT, AND
HAVING GIVEN THE BANK NO INDICATION OF ITS INTENT TO SETOFF
AGAINST 1976 TURKEYS UNTIL AFTER CARLSON BROTHERS' 1976
GROWING YEAR AND THE BANK'S FINANCING OF CARLSON FOR THAT
YEAR HAS ALMOST COMPLETED, UTG SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO
RETAIN THE SUMS IT RECEIVED FOR CARLSON BROTHERS' 1976
BIRDS, AND WHICH IT SETOFF AGAINST THE BANK.
As mentioned earlier, in June, 1976, Carlson Brothers
materially altered its contractual arrangement with UTG by entering into a live flock marketing agreement (Exhibits P-12, P-13,
Tr. 180-190).

Earlier in this memorandum mention has been made as

to how this arrangement revised both the marketing relationship
and contractual posture of Carlson Brothers' role in UTG (see
pages 5-6 hereof).

When UTG was organized it was anticipated that

it would function solely on a common pool basis.

No thought was

given to the possibility that in the future a grower might choose
to participate on a live flock basis (Tr. 321-322).

In

conjunction with Carlson Brothers' change to the live flock
marketing arrangement, all checks or advancements UTG was to pay
to Carlson Brothers were to go directly to the Bank with plaintiff
listed as sole payee

(Exhibit P-ll), Tr. 60-61).

Until late November 1976, all UTG advances to Carlson
Brothers on the 1976 birds were sent directly to the Bank or
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credited to the Bank (Exhibit P-22, Tr. 201-202).

From August

through October, 1976, this course of dealings continued without
any attempt by UTC to setoff or recoup from the 1976 direct line
birds, proceeds claimed to have been overadvanced to Carlson
Brothers in prior years (Tr. 203).

Significantly, although UTG

had decided by August, 1976, to offset the claimed 1973 and 1974
overadvances against its growers, it never informed the Bank of
this intention until it setoff against the last two payments due
the Bank in late November, 1976 (Tr. 202-203).
Only after Carlson Brothers had completed its 1976
growing season and after the Bank, in reliance on UTG's representations, had financed Carlson's operations for that year, did
UTG attempt the setoff againnst the 1976 birds (Tr. 205, 210). h::
no time prior to November 15, 1976 did UTG ever attempt to setoff
on checks payable to the Bank any claimed sum owed it by Carlson
Brothers (Tr. 204-205).

The only time an offset was made against

1976 Carlson Brothers' birds was on the final two payments of thE

year (Tr. 205).

Even though the 1976 birds were governed by a

completely different contractual arrangement, between UTG and
Carlson Brothers, UTG still setoff proceeds received for 1976
birds against the alleged overadvances made during the old
arrangement (Tr. 209).
And UTG not only setoff some $113,000 for the balance
the purported earlier 1973 and 1974 overadvancements, but also
additional sum of $28,427.65 (Exhibit P-21) which was for an
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alleged account receivable Carlson Brothers - not the Bank - owed
uTG (Tr. 207).

This sum had nothing to do 1vith processing fees

incurred by UTG, but was nonetheless setoff from a check made
payable to the Bank, a sum which UTG claimed Carlson Brothers owed
it (Tr. 107).
The plaintiff Bank urges that having established a course
of dealings by which 1976 bird payments were made without setoff
until the very end of the payment year, that by recognizing the

1976 live flock marketing agreement created a different contractual arrangement than the old one, and by failing to timely inform
the Bank of any claimed offset on the 1976 birds until it was too
late for the Bank to protect itself, UTG should be estopped fr.om
claiming both the $113,000 sum setoff for the alleged earlier
overadvances and the $28,427.65 sum for the old account receivable.

Particularly with respect to the latter setoff the Bank

never received any value for that receivable.
The earlier mentioned Professor Douthwaite writes the
following:
Where a recipient's change of position
results from his reliance on an express
representation, or one implicit from the fact
situation, a claimant can be estopped from
asserting his claim to restitution. Closely
parallel is the doctrine that a known right
can be lost by its waiver, or intentional
relinquishment.
The conceptual difference
between estoppel and waiver in so far as they
relate to defenses to restitution, may thus
be explained: When a claimant is defeated by
reason of estoppel it is because he has been
"stopped" from claiming another's enrichment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

as unjust because it is he, himself, who by
words or conduct has caused the other to act
to his detriment; when, on the other hand,
the defense is based on waiver, the thinking
is more that it is the policy favoring the
stability of transactions, of requiring that
"commitments seriously assumed are to be
honored," that stands in the way of his claim.
Mere negligence on the part of a
mistaken payor of money is not of itself a
bar to restitution if the recipient has not
changed his position; however, a willful
neglect to investiage the facts before making
payment can, in a strong enough case, be so
blatant as to estop the payor from asserting
his mistake. After discovery of the mistake,
if the payor fails promptly to notify the
recipient of the mistake, and this results in
prejudice to the latter, there is an overlap
between change of position and estoppel as a
defense. Douthwaite, supra at 9.3, pp.
374-375.
-Plaintiff does not contend the defendant wilfully or
fraudulently misled plaintiff.
officers and management of UTG.

Plaintiff respects and admires
It does contend that defendant

was negligent, that plaintiff changed its position based on
negligent statements of UTG on which plaintiff was entitled
rely.

~

It believes UTG negligently failed to timely inform the

Bank of UTG' s intended setoff against the 1976 birds which were
governed by the new arrangement.

As a result, when the setoffs

finally were claimed, the Bank was left without protection,

!
without adequate security, and without means to cover its losses,:

And those losses either would not have occurred or could have
mitigated but for the negligence of UTG.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT UTG WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT, THAT IT HAD NO PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS BETWEEN CARLSON BROTHERS AND
THE BANK, AND THAT THE BANK DID NOT RELY ON THE
JANUARY 7, 1976, LETTER ARE ALL CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. AS A RESULT, THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A.

THE IMPACT OF UTG'S NEGLIGENCE.

In a rather recent decision this Court has held that
where a party negligently supplies information to one whom it
knows or should know will rely on the accuracy of that information, such negligence renders it liable to one who does in fact
rely on that information.

In Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529

P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) an action by a stock purchaser against, among
others, an accounting firm, this Court held that lack of privity
between a third party and an accountant is not a defense in tort

~~

where the accountant is aware that its work will be relied on by
the third person.
In the course of its opinion this Court wrote:
. . • Other courts have taken the view that
an accountant is liable for his negligence to
a relying party, despite the absence of
privity, when in preparing his report the
accountant knew that a particular party or
parties would rely on the report for a particular purpose. We are of the opinion that
the lack of privity is not a defense where an
accountant who is aware of the fact that his
work will be relied on by a party or parties
who may extend credit to his client or assume
his client's obligations . . . Id. at 808.
An analagous provision in the Restatement of Torts 2d
reflects the same policy underlying this Court's decision in
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Milliner, supra.

Restatemen:.: of Torts 2d, Section 552 deals wit:,

liability of one who negligently supplies information for the
guidance of others.

That Section states:

(1)
One who, in the course of his business,
employment or in any other tian5aetion in
which he has ~pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions, is subject to
pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
Restatement of Torts 2d, supra
§ 552 pp. 126-127 (1977) (emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing it is apparent that the actor's
conduct need only be negligent - not fraudulent.
Restatement of Torts 2d, supra at pp. 127-128.

See Comment(<),:
In addition, the '
I

negligent representor is liable if he either makes the represent?- I
tion within the scope of his business or employment or if he has
pecuniary interest.

While recognizing that although not

conclusive:
•
. that the information is given in the
course of the defendant's business, profession or employment is a sufficient indication
that he has a pecuniary interest in it, even
though he receives no consideration for it at
the time.
Comment lQl, supra at pp. 129-130.
The same Comment indicates that:
. . . officers of a corporation, '-'-though
they receive no personal considecation for
giving information concerning itc affairs,
may have a pecuniary interest in ~ts transactions, since they stand to profindirectly from them .
Id. at ~'· 129.
See also Comments (b) and (c), supr~.
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And in its decision in Morgan v. Board of State Lands,

with

549 P.2d 695

Estoppel is a doctrine of equity proposed to
rescue from loss a party who has, without
fault, been deluded into a course of action
by the wrong or neglect of another.
The
measure we apply to plaintiffs' claim of
estoppel is an adaptation to this case of the
standard heretofore approved by this court:
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant
Board) by his acts, representations, or
admissions, or by his silence when he ought
to speak, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another (plaintiffs) to
believe certain facts to exist and that such
other (plaintiffs) acting with reasonable
prudence and diligence, relies and acts
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice
if the former (Land Board) is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts.
Id. at 697
(emphasis added).
See also Baggs v~
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) but see
Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953);
Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404
P.2d 30 (1965); Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat
Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964);
EaStOn V. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332
(1965).

the '
I

ent?-1

has

(Utah 1976), this Court IHote:

,I

In its findings of facts and conclusion of law, the trial
court held the following:

(1)

that defendant's failure to detect

the issuance of the $262,000 check (Exhibit P-18) when it computed
the 1974 final settlement was not negligence (R 265 par. 10);

(2)

that neither Gaylord Harward nor UTG had any pecuniary interest in
business transactions between the Bank and Carlson Brothers, and
that there was no pecuniary advantage to UTG that the Bank
furnished financing to Carlson Brothers (R 267-268, pars. 13, 14);
and

(3)

that there was no evidence that had the Bank known of the
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offsets to be assessed against Carlson brothers it would have
declined future advances in 1976 and that no evidence supported
plaintiff's claim that credit was extended to Carlson Brothers
based on the January 7, 1976 letter (R 267, 270 pars. 13, 20).
I

As to the finding that the defendant was not negligent i::
creating and discovering the nearly three-quarters of a million
dollars in overadvances to its growers, plaintiff respectfully
suggests the uncontroverted facts compel a contrary conclusion.

I

I

The sheer magnitude of the sums involved and the time length over
which they occurred are remarkable.
misaccount for $750,000.

Few businesses can afford to

UTG's then manager was aware of shor~ I

ages in both 1974 and 1975, but no attempt was apparently

made~

have an accountant review the grower settlement accounts until
mid-1976 (Tr. 137).

1

I
I

With respect to the $262,000 check advance

which the manager and the bookkeeper failed to include in Carlson
Brothers' final settlement for the 1974 growing year, both
admitted they simply overlooked this check (Tr. 210-211, 288).
Significantly, that check was not missing from UTG's check ledger
when the mistake was made (TR. 28 8) •

When Mr. Squires revei~1ed

the settlements, he located the error (Tr. 142).

And it was not

necessary for him to look beyonct UTG's own books to discover that
the oversight had occurred {Tr.

142-14~).

With respect to the over advances c<- used by UTG' s relia""
on the Norbest settlement summaries, a comp~rison and totaling'
the product settlement summaries and of the sales remittance
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reports with the totals sh01m on the Norbest settlement summaries
would have revealed the discrepancies between the two figures
(Tr. 360).

When the accountant did so, the error was spotted.

In summary, the evidence concerning the overadvancements
to its growers seems to have been within the sole custody of UTG.

i·l

Massive miscalculations of amounts were made and, as a result, the
Bank suffered substantial losses.
intentioned, were material.

~r

tc

The mistakes, however well-

UTG knew the Bank looked to it to

I provide accurate information as to the status on Carlson Brothers'
!,

197 5 turkeys

(Tr. 15 4) .

It assumed the Bank would use the

I

:- I information contained in the January 7, 1976, letter (Tr. 158).
~

Defendant's own expert witness testified that in his experience
few accounting errors are made that come before final settlement
(Tr. 255).

~

The finding of the trial court that actions of the

defendant did not constitute negligence is against the clear
weight of all the evidence.

It is respectfully contended that

this Court should reverse the findings of the trial judge.
B.

Q''

THE H-IP ACT OF UTG' S PECUNIARY INTEREST.

Plaintiff also avers that the trial court finding that no
ot

pecuniary interest furnished a motivation for the January 7, 1976,

h~

letter is similarly against the weight of all the evidence.

At

the outset, attention is called again to the language in Restate-

a,·

~ of Torts 2nd,

1 r

S~ction,

Section 552 (l), supra.

As plaintiff reads that

it imposes liability for the negligent supplying of

information to others if only one of two possible conditions
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exist:

(1)

if the statement is made in the course of business o:

employment, or

(2)

if the speaker as a business representative or

the business has any pecuniary interest in the business.
supra.

See also Comments (a),

(b),

(c) and (d).

Id.

Since UTG's mrt

Manager wrote the January 7, 1976, letter under UTG's own letterhead (Exhibit P-9), and since he admittedly wrote that letter

~

behalf of UTG (Tr. 150), the requisite bases for liability seem t'
exist regardless of the pecuniary interest.
However, the undisputed evidence introduced at trial Ha:
that UTG did have a pecuniary interest in whether Carlson Brother·
participated as its member grower.

As a general rule a grower's,

turkey raising operations are financed by a lender

(Tr. 171-172).

UTG knew that the Bank financed Carlson Brothers (Tr. 172, 333).
Since the Bank did not finance UTG in 1977 and Carlson Brothers
did not grow turkeys in 1977, it is apparent that Carlson Brothe:
needed financing to stay in business.

The whole purpose for an

agricultural cooperative is to have a group of growers so that
unit costs for each member will be minimized
of any grower hurts a coop.
the loss (Tr. 170-171).

The

And the larger the grower, the 1arc

UTG' s manager test if ieo that if in 19 7'1

UTG had lost Carlson Brothers'
an adverse economic effect upon
In addition,

(Tr. 170).

1siness, that loss would ha~'
t'G for that year

(Tr. 171).

in its business operations, UTG assesses

proces::;ing charge per pound on all grower t11rkeys it picks
(Tr. 174).

ur

These charges are assesseC! on a p0r pounC! basis s'
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that the greater the grower poundage, the greater the processing
charge

(Tr. 175).

The processing charges are used to pay UTG's

overhead, its utility and other day-to-day operation costs, and
employee salaries (TR.l75).

The more poundage Carlson Brothers

produced, the more processing fees UTG would obtain for payment of
salaries, overhead and operating expenses (Tr. 176).

And at

trial, Manager conceded that it was very much in UTG's interest to
have Carlson Brothers producing, and producing a substantial
volume of turkeys (Id.).
The finding that UTG had no pecuniary interest in the
continuance of the banking relationship between plaintiff and
Carlson Brothers is simply contrary to the evidence.

There was

such a pecuniary interest and UTG should be liable to plaintiff
for damages caused by the negligence, however well-meaning, of UTG.

C.

THE HlP ACT OF THE BANK'S RELIANCE.

Finally, plaintiff urges the uncontroverted evidence also
establishes that the Bank did rely on the January 7, 1979, letter
in advancing 1976 sums to Carlson Brothers.

Mr. Cheever testified

the letter was a part of the information relied on by the Bank to
extend 1976 financing

(Tr. 52).

Roy Hanson also stated that the

January 7 letter was "a very basic factor in our decision as to
lvhether we v1ould finance them"

[Carlson Brothers]

(Tr. 101).

The

Bank's approval of its 1976 decision to finance Carlson Brothers
was based, at least in part, on the expectation that some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-34-

$400,000.00 would be forthcoming to the Bank from the 1976 year
Carlson Brothers' birds (Tr. 104).

The Bank also relied on

receiving the proceeds of the 1976 birds under the live marketinc
contract (Tr. 65).
UTG assumed the Bank would rely on the accuracy of the
figures contained in the January 7 letter

(Tr. 154).

It assumed

the Bank requested the information concerning the 1975 Carlson
Brother's turkeys because Carlson still owed the Bank money
(Tr. 155).

By giving the Bank information as to tonnage price,

assuming 1975-1976 market conditions held (ana little if any
evidence shows they did not so hold for that year) UTG gave the '
Bank a basis by which it could multiply tonnage by anticipated
price so that a possible final settlement figure could be
estimated (Tr. 151).

Importantly, UTG assumed the Bank would mo<•

such multiplications so that it could anticipate the possible lri
settlement sum for Carlson Brothers (Tr. 158).
Plaintiff urges that here again the trial court findi~c

I

was against the uncontroverted evidence at trial and should be I
reversed.

In addition, the Bank strongly asserts that the tria:,

i

court's finding concerning the Department of Agriculture's
requirements

(R-263 par. 7)

I

is not only irrelevant but unsuppor:.l

by evidence introduced at trial.
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IV.
THERE WAS A LACK OF MUTUALITY BETWEEN UTG AND THE
BANK, AND THUS UTG WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DEPRIVE THE BANK
OF PROCEEDS OF THE SALES OF CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS.
THIS WAS BECAUSE UTG COULD NOT EXERCISE A SETOFF AGAINST
THE BANK FOR AN OBLIGATION CARLSON BROTHERS, AND NOT THE
BANK, ALLEGEDLY OWED UTG.
When UTG deprived the Bank of proceeds UTG had received
from the sale of 1975 and 1976 Carlson Brothers' turkeys in which

d'

the Bank had a security interest, UTG seems to have assumed that
if it had the right of setoff against Carlson Brothers it also had
the same right of setoff against the Bank.

The plaintiff Bank

believes this reasoning was erroneous because UTG failed to take
into account the lack of mutuality of obligation between it and
the Bank.
The Bank and Carlson Brothers stood in different
positions vis-a-vis UTG.

Carlson Brothers was contractually

olbligated to both UTG and the Bank.
contract with UTG (TR. 88).
UTG's bylaws.

c,

I
I

'I
I

I

~

UTG.

The Bank had no written

The Bank did not agree to be bound by

Plaintiff did not sign any grower contract with

It merely financed the operations of Carlson Brothers.

The

Bank had a security interest in the Carlson Brothers' turkeys.
UTG did not (Exhibit P-7).

Until Carlson Brothers' obligations to

the Bank were fully paid the Bank had the right to the proceeds of
all sales of the turkeys and it had a security interest in those
birds.

UTG was aware of those security interests and generally

recognized them prior to 1976.
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If UTG, as a result of its own erroneous computations,
overadvanced monies to Carlson Brothers, its remedy was against
Carlson Brothers.

But it did not have the right to refuse to

deliver to the Bank proceeds from the sale of collateral in whic'
the Bank had a security interest.
exe~

It is basic general law that before one party can

cise a right of setoff against another, there must be a mutualit"
of obligation.

There may have been mutuality of obligation

between the Carlson Brothers and UTG and there was a
obligation between the Bank and Carlson Brothers.

mutuali~~~

But there was

lack of mutuality between the Bank and UTG which should have
precluded any right of UTG to setoff against the Bank.

The simpi

fact is that UTG had no legal right to refuse to deliver to the
Bank those proceeds for the sale of Carlson Brothers'

collater~

in which the Bank had a perfected security interest.

See

ally 80 C.J. S.

Set-Off

~

geM~

Counterclaim, § 48 (c), p. 79 states:

As a general rule a debt against a third
party to the record or a demand against the
plaintiff in favor of a third person not a
party to the action cannot be pleaded in
recoupment, compensation or reconvention, or
as a counterclaim, cross action, or set-off.
I

In the Oklahoma decisi.on of Sarkeys v. _~larlow, 235 P.2:
676

1

(Okla. 1951) an action to recover rents allegedly due on re''

property, the syllabus by the court set forth the general rules .
law pertaining to set-off:
2.
There must be privity of
parties in order to enable a defendant to
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plead and prove a set-off, and defendant
cannot plead and Prove a set-off in favor of
himself and against one who is not a party to
the suit.
3. To warrant a set-off debts must be
mutual and the principle of mutuality
requires that the debts should be due to and
from the same persons and in the same
capacity.
Id. at 677.
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff is aware of the recent Utah decision, Preston
v. Gulf Oil Company, 565 P.2d 787

(1977).

In that case this Court

held that where a lessee on an oil lease had mistakenly made some
overpayments to the lessor, where when the error was noted the
lessee promptly notified the lessor and withheld future payments
until the sum had been recovered, and then began making correct
payments, and where the lessor had not been prejudiced by the
overpayment, that the lessee could recoup.
The Bank believes Preston is distinguishable from the
case before this court in the following material particulars:
(1)

There was a mutuality of obligation in Preston

between the lessor and lessee.
(2)

There is not in this case.

Preston did not involve a situation where

collateral or proceeds of a protected secured creditor were
withheld from the secured creditor, whereas this case does involve
rights and interests of a secured party.
(3)

The lessor in Preston has been made whole,

whereas here the Bank has suffered major damage as a result of the
withholding of the proceeds;
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(4)

In Preston the lessee promptly notified the

lessor of its mistaken overpayment, whereas UTG officials were
aware of a potential problem years before the setoff was

claim~

and months before they notified the Bank of the decision to seto:
while the Bank was lending money to Carl sons with the

expectatio~

that its loans were secured by the final settlement on the 1975
birds and on all the 1976 birds.

t~l

UTG exercised its setoff on

1976 bird proceeds only at the end of the year after having never

asserted a setoff right to 1976 bird proceeds until the last

'
I

t~

payments (Tr. 106-107, 204, 205).
(5)

In Preston there had been no prejudice to the

lessor as a result of the overpayments, whereas in this case tle
Bank was materially prejudiced, not only because it assumed no
setoff would be claimed, but also because UTG led the Bank to
believe it would receive proceeds from the 1975 and 1976 birds~'
Carlson Brothers.
(6)

The lessor in Preston suffered no damages fro1

the setoff whereas in this case plaintiff did suffer damages
because it lost a substantial security (the proceeds)
it had.

it believe:!

In addition, UTG setoff from the Bank some $28,000.00 i'

accounts receivable Carlson Brothers 01~ed UTG.

The Bank had nel''

received any payment for or benefit from such accounts receivable.

They were de!Jts pure and simple bet1~een UTG and Carlson

Brothers.

Yet UTG withheld proceeds b~longing to the Bank to
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UTG.

The lessor in Preston did not suffer damages because it

advanced monies which were overpaid it.

In Preston no security

interest of the lessor was violated as a result of the overpayments by the lessee.

V. UTG CONVERTED THE CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS OR THE
PROCEEDS THEREOF RELEVANT TO THIS ACTION.
The elements of the tort of conversion are:
(1)

An intentional interference by the defendant

with a plaintiff's right to possession of personal property;
(2)

A material tortious inference by the defendant

in such a manner as to deprive the plaintiff of his rightful use
of the property; and
(3)

Damages which consist of the full value of the

property at the time of the conversion.
2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728

Allred v. Hinkley 8 Utah

(Utah 1958); see also 18 Am.Jur.2d

Conversion§ 18, 43 and 47.
The Baker Production Credit Association, supra, decision
referred to at some length in Section I hereof on security
interests specifically involved a successful claim of a secured
creditor that its proceeds had been converted.
1137.

Id. at 1130-31,

Other decisions in Western States have recognized that

money, as well as other personal property may be converted.

Wood

Industrial Coro. v. Rose, 271 Ore. 103,530 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1975);
Marker v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 353, 442 P.2d 97,
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104

(1968).

Similarly, the failure of a person to deliv"r to the

owner funds held in trust has been held to constitute a conversion.

Inland-Ryerson Construction v. Brazier Const., 7 Wash App,

558, 500 p.2d 1015, 1021 (1972)

0

In the case before this court, the Bank had a security
interest in the subject property.

The sale of the collateral and

subsequent withholding of the proceeds thereof by UTG deprived
bank of both the collateral and the proceeds.

t~i

UTG converted

assets of the Bank to satisfy alleged offsets it claimed Carlsoo
Brothers owed it.

To do so damaged the Bank to the full

extent~

the collateral and proceeds converted.
Plaintiff contends the elements of the tort were
lished at trial.

esta~

There was general agreement among several of

UTG's growers who testified at trial that the price Norbest

pa~

for turkeys during the 1973 through 1976 years was a rather
accurate reflection of the going fair market value of the birds.
(Tr. 305, 308-309)
I

VI.
UNDER THEORIES OF ESTOPPEL, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL OF I
WAIVER UTG SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FRON CLAIMING AN OFFSET
AGAINST THE BANK.
Earlier in this memorandum the Bank has cited language
from the Utah Supreme Court's decision in ~1organ v. Boar~
Lands, supra, which sugge:;ted that estoppel may arise 1·7hen one
party by its actions or silence intentionally or negligently
induces another to believe certain facts to exist and inrluces
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reasonable reliance and consequent injustice.

Id.

at 695.

also Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974).

See

But see

other cases mentioned on page 29 in section III(A) hereof.
In the instant case, with knowledge that the Bank sought
information as to the status of Carlson Brothers UTG supplied the
Bank with the information which influenced it to loan money to
Carlson Brothers.

Even if UTG did not know in January, 1976, that

substantial overpayments had been made, the information was within
their knowledge--and apparently only within their knowledge.

The

apparent erroneous overpayments, and the representations to the
Bank concerning the financial status of Carlson Brothers, without
taking reasonable care to ascertain the existence of the overpayments was, in the Bank's opinion, negligence.

The size of the

overpayments involved here must certainly militate against holding
that the overpayment was a slight error or excusable negligence.
An analagous principle relied on by the Bank is that of
promissory estoppel.

Although this Court has used the doctrine

somewhat sparingly (e.g. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 286, 295 P.2d
332 (1956); Petty v. Gincly, 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30

(1965);

Union Tank Car Company v. 1\Theat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d
1000

(1965), the doctrine has been recognized.

The elements of

that doctrine are set out in the Restatement of Contracts, § 90
and were quoted by this Court in Ravarino v. Price, P.2cl 570, 575
(l953) :
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A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part o~ the promise and
which does induce such action or forebearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
The Bank believes those conditions are all met by the
fact situation involved in this lawsuit and that promissory
estoppel and/or estoppel should preclude UTG from claiming a
setoff against the Bank.

The Bank retained its security interest in Carlson
Brothers 1 turkeys and their proceeds.

Any disposition of either

by UTG was subject to the Bank s security interests and UTG owesJ
1

the Bank the full sum of such proceeds.

If, notwithstanding the"'•
securi~

arguments, this Court finds the Bank waived or lost its

interest in favor of UTG, then UTG is still liable to the Bank
•

•

I

because the Bank would have lost its security interest 1n rel1anc·
on UTG 1 s indications that the Bank would be paid.
In any event UTG may not setoff against the Bank monies
the Bank never received from either UTG or Carlson Brothers.

I

I
I
1

Additionally, under theories of conversion, negligence, estoppel\
and promissory estoppel UTG is liable to the Bank for the full
of monies UTG withheld.

The decision of the trial court which

dismissed the complaint should be reversed.

Ani~ the trial cour'

should be directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff·
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the sum of $457,608.00, or, alternately, the sum of $142,306.79
(which includes the sum of $113,878.54 plus $28,427.65).
DATED this .::lrday of

_ _,tJCI/>VA(&:::J.-====-'

19 7 9 •

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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